"Unity in Diversity" was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Constitutional Treaty. The motto did not make it into the Treaty of Lisbon. It deserves to be kept alive in a new constitutional perspective, namely the re-conceptualisation of European law as new type of conflicts law. The new type of conflicts law which the paper advocates is not concerned with selecting the proper legal system in cases with connections to various jurisdictions. It is instead meant to respond to the increasing interdependence of formerly more autonomous legal orders and to the democracy failure of constitutional states which result from the external effects of their laws and legal decisions on non-nationals. European has many means to compensate these shortcomings. It can derive its legitimacy from that compensatory potential without developing federal aspirations.
The paper illustrates this approach with the help of a topical example, namely the conflict between European economic freedoms and national industrial relations (collective labour) law. The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ in Viking, Laval, and Rüffert in which the Court established the supremacy of the freedoms over national labour law is criticised as a counterproductive deepening of Europe's constitutional asymmetry and its social deficit.
The introductory and the concluding sections generalise the perspectives of the conflicts-law approach. The introductory section takes issue with max Weber's national state. The concluding section suggests a three-dimensional differentiation of the approach which seeks to respond to the need for transnational regulation and governance. Conflicts-law constitutionalism is the third way which this essay will explore and defend. This is a sociologically realist and normatively ambitious suggestion --and certainly one which must not be misunderstood as a sceptic retreat from Europe's common project with its commitments to democracy and the rue of law. As a precautionary move, the first section will recall a classical address of Max Weber's. It will use this reference to re-construct a legacy of crucial significance and topical relevance, namely the taming of economic nationalism. Section II will deal with the legitimacy problématique of this project's original institutional design and discuss three significant theoretical efforts of the foundational period to cope with this challenge.
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Section III will then analyse the post-foundational dynamics of the integration project and argue that these developments have exhausted the analytical adequacy and normative validity of the all three theoretical concepts. Section IV will present the conflicts law approach as an alternative response to Europe's legitimacy problématique. Exampla trahunt: the recent labour law jurisprudence of the CJEU will serve to illustrate the alternative framing of the conflict constellation which the Court had assess (Section V). An Epilogue summarise its problems and perspectives.
I. Max Weber's economic Nationalism
Max Weber inaugural address in the University of Freiburg of 1895 was to become a real classic. The address was published in under the instructive title "The National State and Economic Policy". 2 It has regained a fascinating, albeit disquieting, topicality for two reasons. The first concerns the object of the field study which Weber used to explain some of his more abstract theoretical positions and provocative political views. The field study dealt with the reasons for, and implications of, the migration of workers. It is of stunning topicality -and the analysis which Weber delivered excels in precision and subtlety. However, Weber also used this case to explain and defend a vision of the political and economic commitments of the nation state, which is, at best, a contrast to the European vocation.
Weber drew upon the empirical work which he had undertaken in 1892, while still a Pivatdozent in Berlin, in the context of a major Enquète of the Verein für Socialpolitik (Association for Social Reform) on the situation of the agrarian work force in the German Reich. He had focused there on "the posting of workers" from Poland to the Prussian Province of West-Prussia. His analysis addressed the transformation of pre-modern of patriarchical structures into a capitalist agrarian economy, identified the pressures which this processes exerted on the landowners, described the incentive structure which fostered the import of "cheap labour" from the neighbouring regions of Poland and from the deeper East Galicia. 3 The capability of the Poles to endure the poor working conditions and the social situation in the new agrarian economy, so Weber observed, was fostering the gradual increase of the Polish and the decrease of the German share. The great theorist of occidental rationalism felt deeply irritated. Weber expressed his concern about the decline of "Germanness" (Deutschtum) in West Prussia. And, equally irritating in EUperspectives, he called for corrective state measures: a closure of the borders to migrating workers, and the purchase of land by the state.
Even more irritating, however, is what he submits as his "subjective" position -the value judgements nurturing his political advice.
"And the nation State is for us not an indefinite something that one feels one can place all the higher the more its essence is shrouded in mystical gloom, but the worldly power organisation of the nation, and in this nation State is raison d'état for us, the ultimate value criterion on economic considerations too. It does not mean to us, as a strange misunderstanding believes: 'state assistance' instead of 'self-help', national regulation of economic life instead of the free play of economic forces, but we want through this slogan to raise the demand that for questions of German national economic policy --including the question whether and how far the State should interfere in economic life or whether and when it ought instead to set the nation's economic forces free to develop themselves and tear down restraints on them --in the individual case the last and decisive vote ought to go to the economic and political power interests of our nation, and its bearer, the German State." 4 Even Weber's audience in Freiburg was apparently upset and Weber distanced himself later from this strong language.
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What motivated his polemic? Weberian sociologist and historians underline that Weber never understanding of value judgments as being changeable and always carrying an irrigational element. Neither should Weber's reference to be interpreted as an ethnic nationalism nor should his insistence on the importance of "the economic" be equated with that of contemporary mainstream economics. 6 What does indeed differentiate carefully and clearly between general methodological, economical, and political orientations which will, in his view unavoidably so, inform the Volkswirtschaftspolitik (economic policy-making).
When he diagnoses the readiness of migrant workers from Poland to accept the hardships of their new existence in the "host state", he is, in fact, describing what we would call a "race to the bottom" and questioning 4 The translation is not taken from the source in note 2 but was done by Iain F. precisely the "willingness to starve the most" as the underlying mechanism.
There is a critical dimension in Weber's position, in particular in his rejection of any claim to "objective validity" of arguments presented in the name of economic theorising; such arguments tend to camouflage normative judgements and political choices -a cardinal sin in the eyes of Weber's epistemology. This is not to defend the substance of Weber's pronouncements. We have reasons to remain irritated when reading about the "role played by physical and psychological racial differences between nationalities [sic!] in their struggle for existence". 7 And yet, Weber the methodology remains an important warning against spurious claims, not only of the historical school, but also of contemporary neo-classical economics Lisbon was perceived as an erosion of the permissive consensus that had backed the progress of integration. During the present financial crisis the instability of Europe's economic constitution became apparent. All of these unresolved issues and queries seem to suggest that we have to re-consider our premises.
It would, of course, in particular under the impression of the present crisis be absurd to assume that conceptual re-orientations, which an academic legal exercise such as the one we are undertaking, could produce ready-made recipes to Europe's multi-faceted problématique. However, we cannot hope to find proper practical responses without any conceptual guidance. In that sense our project is ambitious. What we suggest in nothing less than a reconceptualisation of the integration project of paradigmatic proportions. The messages of "conflicts-law constitutionalism" differ from the prevailing visions most markedly in two respects. As the recourse to the notion of conflicts law indicates, the approach assigns primacy to the resolution of conflicts arising out of Europe's diversity rather than the establishment of a unitary legal regime. Equally important, the approach takes account of the ongoing contestation about the kind of polity which the integration process is to generate. This contestation is not different in principle from the ongoing domestic contests about the proper political order -with the important difference, however, that the law of constitutional democracies provides a framework which channels political contestation, while, in contrast, the law of the integration process cannot build upon this type of legitimating framework. This is why we submit that our type of re-thinking and countervisions is in line and supported by the deeper structures of the European political and social fabric. It is also by no means as idiosyncratic as its title may sound. There are affinities with, e.g., Joseph Weiler's juxtaposition of "Europe as unity" v. "Europe as community", 9 and Kalypso Nicolaïdes' vision of a European "demoi-cracy". 10 What approaches like these have in common with conflicts-law constitutionalism is the effort to reflect the historical context of the integrations project, the readiness to acknowledge the limitations of its institutional design, to reflect upon the Union's potential to cope with its present problems, and to search for a re-conceptualisation of Europe's legal architecture within which these challenges can be addressed. This is, methodologically speaking, not fundamentally different from the exercises all schools of legal integration theory have undertaken. Our reconstruction on the merits and shortcomings of that legacy will have to proceed selectively, albeit not arbitrarily. Our analyses will depart from, and be restricted to, three schools of thought of long-term significance. Each of these three has some fundamentum in re: each can claim to conceptualise important elements of Europe's integration law, and each provides normative reasons for its specific conceptualisation for the model of European rule which it defends and promotes. It is a further characteristic of our reconstruction that we take account of both the internal developments of each of these models and the continuous contestation among them, along with the ups and downs in terms of their practical impact. We will also argue, however, that all three have, notwithstanding their remarkable viability, deficits in common, which exhaust their potential to cope with the present challenges that Europe faces. One aspect which the three models have in common can be stated negatively although it is not meant as a critique of their original ambitions and accomplishments. Legal integration theorist in so-called the foundational period were perfectly aware of the discrepancy between the European and the national level of governance, and did not conceive of the European Economic Community as a constitutional democracy in being. What they have in common is a search for legitimate governance beyond nation-state confines and national frames. Their messages on the modes of transnational governance, however, differed significantly: (1) "Europe should be institutionalised as a technocratic regime and be restricted to that function".
(2) "Europe's vocation is the establishment of an 'economic constitution' which is to protect individual freedoms and to discipline the exercise of political power"; and (3) "Europe has accomplished and should preserve an equilibrium between a supranational legal order and ongoing political contestation and bargaining". general, and to the Sozialstaatlichkeit of the new order in particular. 12 He had started to work on European law at the age of 50 -and helped to establish Europarecht as a distinct legal discipline. 13 Precisely his democratic commitments may explain both, Ipsen's sensitivity for the precarious legitimacy of the European system on the one hand, and the affinities between his own response and the work of one of Germany's most famous contemporary public law scholars, namely, Ernst Forsthoff, on the other. These affinities are, at first sight, somewhat surprising in view of the differences in their constitutional theorising; 14 they are, nevertheless, plausible in view of Ipsen's search for a type of rule whose validity was not dependent on democratic legitimacy. The communities were to confine themselves to administering questions of "knowledge", but leave truly "political" questions to democratic and legitimated bodies. 15 The characterisation of the European Communities as "Zweckverbände funktionaler Integration" (organisations with functionally-defined objectives)" was path-breaking. With this theory, Ipsen rejected both further-reaching federal integration notions and earlier interpretations of the community as a mere international organisation. He saw Community law as a tertium between (federal) state law and international law, constituted by its "objective tasks" and adequately legitimised by their solution. 16 This theory had an implicit answer to the queries about "the social" on offer. Ernst Forsthoff had, in his contribution to the so-called Sozialstaatskontroverse, argued that the realisation of social objectives had to 12 Suffice it here to point to Ipsen, "Über das Grundgesetz" (1949) 
II.1 Europe as

II.2 Europe's Economic Ordo: Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm
The notion of the "social market economy" was formally introduced into Müller-Armack, explained repeatedly and clearly, the "social market economy" was to provide a "third way" beyond economic liberalism, on the one hand, and beyond socialism, on the other. There was no conditioning of this model by requirements of "competitiveness"; quite to the contrary, the governance of market mechanisms were subjected to commands of social justice. 20 Müller-Armack and his political allies were keen to underline the compatibility of their vision with the Ordo-liberal School of economics and the essential role assigned to economic freedoms and the protection of an undistorted system of competition by law and strong politically-independent enforcement authorities. The development of Ordo-liberalism as an economic theory and vision of a political order had started in the early 1920s as a counter-move against the strong cartelisation of the German economy and its corporatist links with a weak political system. The school survived National Socialism; it was perceived as one among the German traditions not contaminated by National Socialism and therefore entitled to broad public recognition and influence. The details need not concern us here. What is important to note, however, is our concern for the social dimension of the European project, the initial compatibility of Ordo-liberalism and the model of the social market, and the dissolution of this alliance which was replaced by a new alliance between the second generation of Ordo-liberalism and Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism. 21 The leading protagonists of the Freiburg School, the intellectual Heimat of to the idea of an "undistorted system of competition", on the one hand, and to the promise of social justice and security, on the other, a challenging task: the dual commitment required institutionalising specific, albeit inter-dependent, orders, namely, a legally-structured order of industrial relations and of social security ("Arbeits-und Sozialverfassung") along with the legally guaranteed economic ordo, the "economic constitution" (Wirtschaftsverfassung). In this sense, the economic order of which the protagonists of the "social market economy" envisaged was meant to be "socially embedded".
The "really existing social market economy", however, was never as coherently realised as their conceptual Vordenker would have liked to see it.
Even its economic core institution -its Weiler's oeuvre is a powerful critique of the type of national state which Weber's inaugural address describes. Nowhere, however, did he talk about something akin to "social Europe". Even in the concluding passages on democracy in Europe and the legitimacy of the integration project of the "Transformations of Europe", there is no mention of the possibility that democracy might pre-suppose social justice and that Europe's sociallydefined legitimacy might erode through a destruction of welfare state traditions. And yet, even though Weiler's value-laden work is characterised by a profound distance to technocratic precepts and economic rationalisation of the European Community, his visions seem surprisingly compatible with the benign neglect of the "social deficit" of the European order in European legal studies during the foundational period. To be sure, Weiler's reconstruction of the Europe as a Janus-headed polity was not meant as a conceptualisation which would exclude Europe's engagement in social issues as a matter of (legal) principle. It is, nevertheless, true that, thanks to the Realpolitik-kernel of his analysis, "social Europe" was an unlikely option, and 23 Weiler, "The Community system: the dual character of supranationalism", (1981) one of very limited significance, anyway. It was highly unlikely simply because its advent was dependent on unanimous inter-governmental voting; it was, by the same token, of little concern as the later tensions between the integrationist objective and the legacy of European welfarism were still dormant.
III. The sensitivity of legal inegration theory: three retractions The current problems of the European project are simply overwhelming.
There is no consensus neither in the diagnosis of the causes nor on the proper remedies to be taken and the prospects of political developments which would enable Europe to reconstitute stable perspectives are uncertain. It is nevertheless becoming possible to identify institutional design defects of the integration project and the readiness to address such failures in academic discourses as well as in public debates is growing. It is hence unsurprising that legal integration theory has started to reconsider its premises and prospects. And it seems remarkable indeed that this rethinking has already started before the current crisis. This is the case in all of the three conceptualisation of the integration project -technocratic rule, economic rationality, and the community vision -that we have sketched out above.
These models were not chosen at random. They represent evolutionary options among which the integration project kept oscillating. None of them identified with the ambitions of the constitutional convention and the mainstream strive for a comprehensive democratic constitutionalisation of the Union. All of them have nevertheless or because of that type of modesty been continuously present in Europe's integration process ever since the foundational period. They have of course been developing, even mutating, within their particular perspectives, be it in their responses to changing contexts, be it through mutual observation and political learning. We can neither try to document the continuities and innovations within each tradition, nor discuss the affinities between them in any detail. It is sufficient, for our argument, to characterise crucial transformations within each of them -and to underline telling parallels in their diagnosis of the current impasses.
III.1 Technocracy without Efficiency: Majone's Critical Turn
The importance of the technocratic tradition in the praxis of the integration project can hardly be over-estimated. Its weight was bound to increase with the involvement of the European Community in ever more regulatory policies which were to be organised at transnational levels without the backing of a consolidated democratic order. How else than through an "objective" and expertise-based conceptualisation of its enormous tasks could the European Community hope to ensure the acceptance of its involvement in ever more problem-solving activities? The by far most interesting and influential work which renewed and refined the legacy is that of Giandomenico Majone. 25 It is unique not only in its clarity and its coherence, but also in its reflections of the option for an alternative to the democratic constitutionalism the Member (Routledge, 1996) principle uncontested policy objectives. Welfare policies pose additional problems. The Union's failure to institutionalize a comprehenseive social policy results partly from the "reluctance of the member states to surrender control of a politically salient and popular area of public policy"; equally important is the factual difficulty and political impossibility to replace the variety of European welfare state models and traditions by some integrated European scheme. 27 Not only does Majone respect the primacy of constitutional democracies; he is equally, and with increasing urgency, underlining the fallacy of an ever more perfect and comprehensive subjection of the integration project to its "operational code", the principle "that integration has priority over all competing values" 28 , and also the camouflage strategies which he calls "integration by stealth".
29
This is an alarming retraction from his earlier trust in the problem-solving potential of the European project. His warnings do, by no means, reflect a change of theoretical premises. Majone continues to underline that Europe is not legitimated to pursue the type of distributional politics which welfare states have institutionalised. 30 He does not retract his plea for regulatory efficiency.
His critical turn is, instead, motivated by the inefficiencies which he observes in the Union's operations. His quest for more modesty in Europe's ambitions ("Geht's nicht eine Nummer kleiner?") 31 summarises these observations. His adaptation of the "unity in diversity" formula 32 is an implication of these insights to which we will return in the following Section IV. 
III.2 What is Left of the Economic Constitution: Ordo-liberal Concerns
An institutionalisation of economic efficiency is widely perceived to day, either affirmatively or critically, as Europe's core agenda. 33 Weiler has never subscribed to the far-reaching ambitions of the convention process 49 and he is among the most prominent warners against the quest for "ever more Europe" with comprehensive economic governance. 50 We can summarise the forgoing observations in an interim conclusion: the impasses of the integration praxis are mirrored and foreshadowed by the exhaustion of the main theoretical perspectives which have accompanied and oriented legal reflections, theoretical conceptualisations and the prescriptive 47 Europe's "operational code" is to prioritise integration "over all other conceivable values including democracy". 51 "Unity in diversity", the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, has become Majone's new leitmotiv.
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Our immodest assertion is: The proper legal form of the Draft-Treaty's motto is a reconceptualisation of European law as a new type of supranational conflicts law. Sine the approach has been presented elsewhere often enough, 53 commentary is here restricted to a depiction of its five core messages. 54 
IV.1 Conflicts Law as Democratic Commandment
The entire construction is built upon a sociological observation with normative implications. Under the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation, contemporary societies experience an ever stronger schism between decision-makers and those who are impacted upon by decisionmaking. This schism poses a democracy problem for anybody defending the idea that the citizens of democratic polities should be able to interpret them as in the last instance as the authors of the law they are supposed to comply with. This is the observation on which Jürgen Neyer and the present author based their quest for a legitimation of European law by its potential to compensate structural democracy failures of nation states back in 1997. 55 Even then the argument was not fundamentally new. Jürgen Habermas had submitted a very similar idea in his very first essay on European integration. 56 His most recent re-statement is close to identical with our formula:
"Nation-states … encumber each other with the external effects of decisions that impinge on third parties who had no say in the decision-making process. Hence, states cannot escape the need for regulation and coordination in the expanding horizon of a world society that is increasingly self-programming, even at the cultural level …" 57 Our basic intuition still seems plausible. However, it must not be understood as a kind passé-partout which would justify all kinds of interventions into the political autonomy of constitutional states and their decision-making procedures. Any correction of undemocratic external effects must in itself be justified. Suffice it here to point to the control and correction of budgetary policies and all sectors of national polities by the regulatory machinery which 55 the six pack and the fiscal compact have by now established. 58 This proviso is an integral dimension of the following deliberations and suggestions.
IV.2 The Supranationality of European Conflicts Law
Our plea for a new understanding of EU law, must not, the connotations of its terminological origin notwithstanding, serve as a retraction from supranationalism as such. Quite to the contrary, it furnishes a justification for the validity of the supranational jurisdiction -albeit one which is, just like the three models of legal integration theory discussed above, 59 at the same time 
IV.3 Convergence, Re-construction, Critique
Clearly, such a democratic exoneration of European law is only plausible to the exact degree that it may be re-constructed within this perspective, or that it may be furnished with a conflicts-law orientation. This, however, is already, often enough, the case: European law has given legal force to principles and rules which serve the purpose of supranational "recognition" -the nondiscrimination principle, the supranational definition and the demarcation of legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for justification for actions that are imposed upon national legal systems, and the proportionality principlewhich supplies a legal yardstick against which respect for supranationallyguaranteed freedoms may be measured -and the demand that all public exercise of power pays due regard to fundamental rights. All these principles and rules may be understood as a concretisation of a supranational conflicts law, which guarantees that the actions of the Member States are reconcilable with their position within the Community. This is not to say, however, that the solutions to the conflicts at which European law has actually arrived, are always convincing. Our re-construction of European law in the normative perspectives just outlined will reveal tensions between ""facticity" and "validity", as well as failures and missed opportunities -the conflicts approach shares this type of experience with the three approaches from which it seeks to replace. 
IV.4 Vertical, horizontal and diagonal Conflicts in Europe
IV.5 Conflicts Law as Proceduralising Constitutionalism
It follows from the preceding sections that it would be factually and normatively mistaken to regard European law as a system of law dedicated to the incremental construction of a comprehensive legal edifice. Europe must, learn to accept the fact that its diversity will accompany it far into the future, so that conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise the process of European integration. It should therefore further concede that this process should be overseen by a type of law, which, by virtue of its identification of the principles and rules that govern conflict, will generate the law of the European multi-level system. Europeanisation, then, is not simply a process of change; it is also a learning process. Law cannot pre-determine the substance of such processes, but may yet secure its own normative character, by virtue of its self-dedication to the processes of law-making and its justification (Recht-Fertigung), which mirror and defend the justice and fairness within law.
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This understanding is by no means simply some Germanic idiosyncrasy. 62 It is akin to, for example, Antje Wiener's notion of "the invisible constitution" 63 or Deirdre Curtin's concept of the "living constitution". 64 Should it be that such seemingly daring ideas are in fact realistic in the sense that they represent the only conceivable type of responses to the challenges to which the European project is constantly and permanently exposed? 
V. Examplary illustrations: Market building and the recent
Labour Law Jurisprudence of the CJEU As indicated, the conflicts-law approach is not meant as an artificial juxtaposition to positive European law, but it does claim to take up the legacy of legal realism, and, hence, to articulate that law's "real life", to help us to see what the law "does". This is a reconstructive but by no means a purely affirmative exercise. To submit that European law "is" conflicts law is to underline and illuminate its function and its problematic -the legal responses to the conflicts can be convincing, less fortunate or even deplorable.
V.1 The Example of Cassis de Dijon
The conflicts-law approach advocates mitigation between controversies over diverging policies and complex interest configuration. With this aspiration, the approach departs markedly from the traditional treatment of public law provisions in private international law, international public and administrative law. Europe has, as Jona Israël put it, the chance and vocation to transform the comitas (voluntary and diplomatic co-ordination) among its states and societies into a legally-binding commitment to co-operative against erroneous decisions by German consumers could be achieved by simply disclosing the lower alcohol content of the competing French liqueur.
At closer inspection, the court's answer to the conflict constellation in Cassis is not as plausible as it appears at first sight. As Damian Chalmers, in a critique of this author's praise of Cassis, 67 has underlined, at stake in this constellation which did not only affect only the two directly involved parties, the marketing strategies of a powerful distribution chains like REWE were a threat to the survival of small shops which were not in a position to provide consumers. Through the upgrading of economic freedoms to constitutional rights, the CJEU has indeed assumed en passant constitutional functions. 68 The issue, then, is of whether the Court has gone a step too far when complementing the recognition of the constitutional status of economic freedoms by its authoritative definition of the kind of concerns which are deemed to be compatible with the establishment of a common European market.
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All this however, does in no way affect the reading of Cassis as a conflicts law case. The CJEU handed down a ruling on a complex conflict constellation. This ruling does provide a legal framework for this conflict. The
Court failed to evaluate all dimensions of this conflict when pursuing its market building agenda. This judgment "is" nonetheless conflicts law, albeit not necessarily good law. 
V.2.1 Viking, Laval, Rüffert
These three cases are, by now, so well-known that it should suffice here to summarise their contents very briefly.
The first case was decided on 11 December 2007. 70 Finnish seafarers, employed on the ferry Rosella, become aware of the intention of their employer to flag out to Estonia. Since they were afraid of losing their jobs or being forced to accept lower wages, they tried to impress their employer by threatening to strike. This was legal under Finnish law. But, so their Finnish employer argued, such action was incompatible with its right Viking's right of free establishment as enshrined in Article 43 EC.
The response of the ECJ is conciliatory in its tone, but is, in fact, quite rigid.
The ECJ starts out with underlining that the "right to take collective action, including the right to strike … [is] a fundamental right which forms an This finding is all the more remarkable in view of a prior pertinent decision of Germany's Constitutional Court, which had explained only in 2006: 76 "The combating of unemployment, together with measures that secure the financial stability of the social security system, are particularly important goals, for the realisation of which the legislator must be given a relatively large degree of decisional discretion, and especially so under current, politically very difficult, labour market conditions." 
81
The conflict is to be resolved at the level of primary law and that resolution has then to guide the interpretation of secondary legislation. This leads her to question the validity of the Commission's reading of the said Directive and to suggest that the complaint be dismissed. 82 The second case concerns the compatibility of Belgian requirements relating to the posting of workers in Belgium with the Posted Workers Directive. 
V.3 The Conflicts Law Alternative
What is wrong about all this? There is no space here to comment on the European wide discussion of this jurisprudence. The following remarks will be restricted to some aspects which illuminate the specifics of the conflicts law approach.
86 Case C-271/08, para.s 43-44. -In Case C-515/08 (note 83), the CJEU has handed down its judgment of the ECJ on 7 October 2010, confirming therein that "overriding reasons relating to the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services include the protection of workers" and "recognised that the Member States have the power to verify compliance with the national and European Union provisions" (para.s 47-48) without mentioning the TFEU and the Charter. In their proportionality analysis of the Belgian legislation the AG and the ECJ concurred.
V.3.1 Sweden's Social Democratic Sonderweg
The Laval case is about the conflict between service providers and worker The message of the conflicts-law approach is seemingly abstract: the law should civilise the contest over divergent policies and interests without assuming the mandate to streamline Europe's diversity. There is a categorical difference between economic law and labour law, LyonCaen argues. This is precisely the message of the disciplinary tradition the conflicts-law approach seeks to recall. The most basic notion of this discipline "characterisation", 92 Ernst Rabel explained in his seminal essay. And he added that the operation called "characterisation" has to take the views of the forum and the concerned jurisdictions seriously. At stake here is he discrepancy between economic freedoms and collective labour law. Their 91 "In West European Societies Labour Law was constituted as an alternative to the law of the market. It developed terminological distinctions which one must not disregard liberté de commerce here, freedom of trade there -. To be sure, legislation relating to work had been in place prior to that emancipatory move, but pertinent rules were meant to control work in a way which was more or less akin to laws policing the market or markets in general" (translation by the author) -thus Lyon-Caen, "Droit communautaire du marché v. categorical difference is not written in stone but deeply rooted, albeit in a variety of forms, in the history of industrial and democratised societies. 93 The European law parallel is the principle of enumerated competences.
Awareness of this parallel is no longer widespread among European law scholars. This is unfortunate because the sensitivity of the elder discipline for the specifics of legal fields although provides some guidance in the interpretation of such opaque provisions as Article 137 (5) EC (now 153 (5) TFEU). 94 The prudence suggested by conflicts law should not be read as a "solution" to the conflict constellation the CJEU was confronted with. What conflicts law suggests, however, is not to use European law as an Ersatz and compensation of Europe's political failures. and to ensure the legitimacy of their "weight" and co-ordination is present at all levels of governance, in the international system as well as within constitutional democracies. At all levels, this problématique has provoked a turn to "proceduralisation", and fostered the insight that legal decisionmaking cannot be deductive, but must be constructive and must derive its legitimacy from the quality of the procedures guiding its decision-making processes. The identification of this problématique at all levels of governance and in the "diagonal conflicts constellations" between them, which multilevel constellations generate, is just one message of the conflicts-law approach, which these concluding remarks wish to underline. Equally important is a second message which requires a three-dimensional differentiation of the conflicts-law approach. The title of this section alludes to this second message. "Geology" is a term borrowed from Joseph Weiler, who introduced it to explain transformations of international law of paradigmatic importance. 96 "International law as Regulation" is a notion which he contrasts with "international law as Transaction" and "international law as 
VI.1. Post-interventionist Law and the Turn to Regulation and Governance
These two generations witnessed, or participated in, two big waves of theorising. The first wave was preoccupied with the social deficits and methodological flaws of "legal formalism"; the replacement of formalism by substantive rationality criteria was the slogan of the day. 97 "Law as regulation" was not the then prevailing terminology; substantive rationality was to be carried into law through "interventionism". As all this did not really work out, a second wave of theorising was initiated: substantive rationality was replaced by post-interventionist programming, in particular through reflexive law and the quest for a proceduralisation of the category of law. 98 These moves sought to come to grips with the law's assumption of, and through the discovery of the affinities or structural analogies with conflict of laws. 100 In the meantime, he had already proclaimed the need for a "proceduralisation of the category of law".
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Practice, sociological research and theoretical reflections did not come to a standstill. We have, for many years now, accustomed ourselves to ever more sophisticated regulatory programming and we have, more recently, witnessed a turn to "governance", a notion encompassing a grand variety of widely-used co-operative arrangements between governmental and nongovernmental actors. There is no space and no need to elaborate on all this
here. The only observation to be underlined concerns the structural parallels in the national and the postnational constellations. The geology which Joseph
Weiler has depicted in international law can be observed at all levels, even within constitutional law. Parallel structures generate similar challenges.
Regulatory politics need to be institutionalised and governance arrangements established within the European Union and beyond its "borders". The practical and challenges and normative problem that these developments pose, however, vary considerably.
VI.2. The Need for a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law
Throughout the preceding sections, we have dealt with primary and secondary European law, on the one hand, and the legal systems of the Member States, on the other. The sociological background analytics, the normative premises of the doctrinal fabric of the conflicts approach can, quite plausibly, claim to capture the distinctiveness of the EU multi-level system and its vertical, horizontal and diagonal conflicts adequately. With regard to the latter, it should have become particularly apparent why the conflicts-law approach cannot be reduced to the choice of a particular legal order.
However, European conflicts law is also distinct in the conceptualisation of The third dimension of conflicts law reacts to the "privatisation" of regulative tasks and the development of new "governance arrangements", which can also be observed at national level, but which are, unsurprisingly, particularly important at transnational levels. and societal actors in both of them. What the law needs to be concerned about, is the regulative function which both types exercise, and what it has to consider is its potential to ensure their legitimacy. The conflicts law approach in its third dimension does therefore not qualify these regimes without further ado as transnational "law". Instead, it seeks to develop and promote the impact of normative yardsticks for their recognition by democratic legal orders; it furthermore builds upon the law's shadow, particularly the interests of non-statal orders in external recognition and their ensuing readiness to subject themselves to a stringent procedural discipline. 105
VI.3 Concluding Remark
The re-conceptualisation of European law as a new type of conflicts law was designed as an exercise in critical theory with normative perspectives which could, in many ways, build upon the evolutionary steps in the integration process, on institutional innovations, on the ingenuity of so many committed actors, and their readiness and potential to cope with Europe's complex conflict constellations. The preceding sections even suggest that this approach can be usefully applied beyond the confines of the European Union, that it has so-to-speak a universal imprint. 106 When contrasted with the state of the international system and globalisation process the European project could thanks to its many accomplishments be understood as model which the rest of the world should seek to follow. 107 
